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This Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming) describes 
the field of contract theory and locates the essays in the volume within that field. 
The volume includes chapters from Aditi Bagchi, Randy Barnett, Lisa Bernstein, 
Mindy Chen-Wishart, Charles Fried, Avery Katz, Dori Kimel, Gregory Klass, George 
Letsas and Prince Saprai, Daniel Markovits, Liam Murphy, David Owens, J.E. 
Penner, Margaret Jane Radin, Joseph Raz, Stephen Smith, and Charlie Webb. 
 
 
 
Contract theory is not one thing, but a collection of related inquiries. There 
is variety both in the questions theorists ask and in the methods they use to answer 
them. Among the questions are: What is distinctive about contract law? What are 
its core concepts? For what purpose do we enforce contracts? What justifies their 
enforcement? Given one or another function or justification, what should the rules 
of contract law be? What moral or political principles are relevant to the 
enforcement of contracts? There is also variety in method. Principled arguments of 
contract start from above. They ask first what justifies having a law of contract, and 
from that derive what the rules of contract law should be. Interpretive arguments 
begin from below. They examine the contract law we have, then ask what 
functions and justifications provide the best account of the practice. Critical 
analyses look for hidden purposes or unintended consequences, such as contract 
law’s role in legitimizing or reproducing power relationships. Theorists also use a 
variety of analytic tools. These include moral and political theory, conceptual 
analysis, sociological theory, interpretation, neoclassical economic analysis and 
empirical psychology. 
This introduction sketches the field and locates in it the chapters that 
follow. We have organized those chapters into two large groups: essays that focus 
on general theoretical questions and essays that focus on more specific doctrinal 
questions. But this is a rough cut at best, and only one way to divide things up. 
Because they vary along multiple dimensions, contract theories cannot be ordered 
around or along any single line. So this Introduction will zigzag a bit. 
 
 
 
Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 2 
It will help to define a few technical terms. Laws and collections of laws are 
instruments that society can employ to achieve one or more purposes. The purpose 
or purposes a law serves constitute its function. Because laws involve the 
deployment of collective resources and are ultimately backed by state coercion, 
they also require justification. That justification, if it exists, can be found in the 
moral, political or other principles that render the use of collective resources and 
state coercion permissible.1 Finally, it is sometimes argued that distinct areas of 
law, such as the law of contract, have an internal logic or core set of commitments. 
Just as a language has a grammar, contract law might have basic rules or 
commitments that structure the practice as a whole. This immanent logic, if it 
exists, is contract law’s conceptual structure. Noncritical general theories of 
contract typically focus on one or more of contract law’s function, its justification 
and its conceptual structure. 
Much contract theory occupies itself one way or another with the 
relationship between contracts, which create legal obligations, and promises, 
which create moral ones. Contract law itself uses the language of promising. Courts 
and commentators regularly refer to the parties as “promisor” and “promisee,” and 
the Restatement (Second) of Contract opens by saying that a contract is “a promise 
or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”2 And no matter 
what words the law uses, there are obvious similarities between contracts and 
promises. Both are largely content independent, voluntarily acquired obligations 
owed to a particular person or persons. 
Saying all that does not yet say what the relation between the legal 
obligation and the moral one is. One answer is that contract law functions to 
enforce certain promises. In contemporary Anglo-American scholarship, the thesis 
is most closely associated with Charles Fried’s 1981 book, Contract as Promise. 
Fried’s chapter in this volume updates that theory in light of subsequent work in the 
field. As Fried points out, dominant trends in contract theory have changed 
considerably in the past thirty years. The reliance-based and critical approaches 
that ruled when he wrote the book have been supplanted by economic analysis, 
corrective justice, and new autonomy theories. Fried’s chapter discusses the 
relationship between his approach in Contract as Promise and subsequent work in 
the field. And he uses his chapter to provide new thoughts on topics such as the 
common law’s preference for expectation damages, the consideration doctrine, 
                                                
1 As Charlie Webb puts the point in this volume, ”even where the law’s technical 
rules are determinate and neither require nor invite [appeal to value judgments], 
these source-based norms earn a place in our reasoning and decision-making only 
on the back of norms which get there on the merits.” Charlie Webb, Contract as 
Fact and as Reason, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 
1] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1983). 
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unconscionability, the mitigation rule, contract interpretation, and the objective 
theory. 
The claim that contracts just are legally enforceable promises has led many 
contract theorists back to moral theory and the analysis of promissory obligations. 
Fried, for example, argues that the institution of promising, and by extension 
contract, is built “on the deeper morality of trust and respect for persons.”3 Three 
chapters in this book focus on the morality of promising. Although they make 
different claims, each recommends paying attention not only to the new obligations 
a promisor acquires through her promise, but also to the normative interests or 
obligations of the promisee. 
David Owens asks whether promises are properly characterized as 
transferring something from the promisor to the promisee. He argues against the 
common claim that a promise transfers the right to performance—that “[b]y 
promising, I transfer my . . . entitlement to act within a certain range of options, 
thereby giving that power to others.”4 Appealing to Hume’s point that the mere fact 
of having a right does not entail the power to alienate or transfer it, Owens argues 
that right-transfer theories cannot explain why promises bind. In Owens's view, the 
effect of a promise is rather to give the promisee the power to determine the 
promisor’s moral obligations by deciding whether to insist on performance or to 
release the promisor from her obligation. Promises thereby serve what Owens calls 
the promisee’s “Authority Interest.” “By postulating an interest in the normative 
item that the promisee acquires we can identify the source of a promise’s binding 
force.”5 
Joseph Raz’s chapter explores several aspects of the reasons promises 
generate. Promises are generally content independent: the reason they bind does 
not depend on the act promised. Some acts, however, cannot be promised, such as 
selling oneself into slavery. Raz explains this fact by arguing that the power to 
promise exists only because, and to the extent that, it enhances our moral lives. 
There is no value to giving people the power to enslave themselves. Working from 
the same premise, Raz argues that promisors need not have the power to determine 
the strength of the reasons for performance that their promises create—to determine 
the strength of their promises. The fact that having the power to promise is valuable 
“does not mean that there is value in people being able to determine the strength of 
                                                
3 Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 8] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
4 Gary Watson, Promises, Reasons and Normative Powers, in REASONS FOR ACTION 
155, 170 (D. Sabel & S. Wall eds., 2009), quoted in Owens MS at 17. 
5 David Owens, Does a Promise Transfer a Right?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 18] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai 
eds., 2014). For a more thorough discussion of this claim, see DAVID J. OWENS, 
SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (2012). 
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the reasons that promises generate.”6 Raz then asks how it is that the mere act of 
promising can create a new reason to act. He argues contra Owens that the reason 
to act is not a “bare reason” generated by the mere fact of the promise. Rather a 
promise gives the promisor a reason to perform because of the “normative 
assurance” that a promise provides the promisee, which is the promisee’s 
opportunity to receive performance. 
Dori Kimel also considers the normative position of the promisee. But 
where Raz and Owens emphasize the normative powers that a promise confers on 
the promisee, Kimel is interested in the promisee’s moral duties in exercising those 
powers. Drawing from contract law, Kimel argues that promissory obligations are 
strict. Unless the promisor builds an excuse into the content of her promise, 
nonperformance is a breach of the promise, no matter what its reason or cause. 
This makes promising an especially risky business, in that a promisor might 
undertake obligations she later has reason to regret. If this is right, then “the 
capacity to self-create obligations owed to others may be thought of not only as a 
manifestation or an extension of personal autonomy, but also as something that can 
pose a particularly potent threat to it.”7 In fact, we might do better without the 
power to promise. The threat is reduced, however, by moral obligations of the 
promisee to sometimes exercise the power to release the promisor from her 
promise. Kimel argues that “promises are typically made or exchanged in . . . the 
sort of relationships that tend to generate a wealth of relationship-specific norms 
capable of supplementing, competing with, altering or altogether defeating 
promissory norms.”8 The promisee’s nonpromissory obligations of friendship, for 
example, can require her to excuse nonperformance when the promisor is not at 
fault, thereby reducing the risk attached to the unwise promise.  
For those who believe that contract law functions to enforce promissory 
obligations, such arguments about the structure and scope of the moral obligation 
are highly relevant to understanding the structure and scope of the corresponding 
legal obligation. (I argue below that they might be relevant to other contract 
theorists as well, for other reasons.) If promissory obligations are the reason for 
enforcing contracts, we need to know what promissory obligations are and what 
they entail. 
But promissory theories of contract are not without their critics. The critics 
can be divided into two broad camps: those who agree with Fried that contract 
serves moral ends, but reject his account of those ends, and those who reject moral 
accounts of contract law altogether. 
                                                
6 Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 1o] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
7 Dori Kimel, Promise, Contract, Personal Autonomy, and the Freedom to Change 
One’s Mind, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 3] 
(Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
8 Id. at [MS at 14]. 
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Many who agree with Fried that contract serves moral ends do not agree 
with his claim that it serves to enforce promises. These theorists depart from Fried 
in two distinct ways.9 First, some hold that the legally relevant moral obligations 
are not, or not only, promissory obligations. In his contribution to this volume, 
James Penner argues that contracts are best understood as involving agreements 
rather than promises.10 Penner suggests several differences. First and foremost, 
whereas promises are unilateral acts, agreements are bilateral, involving active 
participation and commitment by all sides. In addition, agreements often arise in 
conditions where there is a preexisting obligation to coordinate behavior or a 
shared interest in accomplishing some project. And agreements are typically built 
on a shared foundation of mutual trust and an appreciation of one another’s 
interests, whereas promises are often prompted by the promisee’s mistrust of the 
promisor. On Penner’s account, “promises are typically parasitic on prior 
agreements and are ‘pathological’ in the sense that they are typically only sought or 
given when a person already obliged is, for one reason or another, less than 
optimally likely to fulfill their obligation.”11 If Penner is correct, we should look for 
a moral basis for the law of contract not in the morality of promises, but in the 
morality of agreements more generally. Such a shift could shed new light on 
doctrines such as the requirement of good faith, the frustration and impracticability 
defenses, and the mitigation rule. 
Other theorists question whether contract law’s function with respect to the 
parties’ moral obligations is one of simple enforcement. Liam Murphy’s chapter 
distinguishes three functions contract law might play with respect to the moral 
sphere. First, contract law might enforce the first-order moral obligation to perform, 
as Fried suggests. Second, contract law might enforce second-order obligations that 
come into being only after the wrong of breach, as corrective justice theories claim. 
Third, contract law might be deployed instrumentally to increase social welfare, 
attending to the parties’ particular obligations to one another only as a means to 
that broader end. Murphy discusses examples of the first two approaches, which he 
argues do not succeed. Enforcement theories are difficult to square with the law’s 
preference for expectation damages over specific performance, and they run 
contrary to a liberal suspicion of using state coercion “merely for the sake of 
improving a person’s own welfare, or enforcing their obligations, or making them 
                                                
9 Both are discussed in Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695 
(2012). 
10 Penner’s chapter updates and extends his earlier work on the subject in J.E. 
Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract, 2 LEGAL 
THEORY 325 (1996).  
11 J.E. Penner, Promises, Agreements, and Contracts, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 18] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
 
 
 
Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 6 
more virtuous.”12 Expectation-based corrective justice theories “offer[] no argument 
at all for the idea that all promisees have moral rights that it is the business of the 
law to protect.”13 Reliance-based corrective justice theories can explain neither 
why the law provides recovery for reliance on promises but not other sorts of 
reliance, nor the law’s preference for the expectation measure. This leaves 
instrumentalist approaches, which “will not try to track the moral duties and 
interests of parties to particular agreements but will rather take a broader view, 
finding the point of the institution in the overall social good it produces.”14 
Murphy’s preferred instrumentalist approach is like economic analysis in that it 
identifies contract law’s function as the promotion of social welfare. But Murphy 
takes a broader view of what constitutes social welfare. Whereas traditional 
economic analyses ask what remedies are likely to maximize the parties’ joint 
profits, Murphy would ask what remedy is better for society as a whole, with a 
focus on contract law’s role in supporting the social practice of making and 
keeping agreements. 
Charlie Webb argues in his chapter that contracts necessarily give rise to 
promissory obligations, but that those obligations are not the reason for their legal 
enforcement. Contracts entail promises, according to Webb, because legal 
obligations claim to be moral obligations and so to voluntarily undertake a legal 
duty to perform a contract is also to voluntarily undertake a moral obligation to do 
so.  “[I]f and in so far as contracts do involve the voluntary assumption of 
obligations—whatever their content—then these obligations are moral 
obligations.”15 It does not follow, however, that the promise is the reason for legal 
enforcement. “Whatever reasons we may identify for regarding promises as 
obligation-creating may not be reasons to take them as creating legal rights and 
duties such as support state policing and intervention in the event of breach.”16 
Webb does not fully articulate a theory of legal enforcement, but suggests that the 
relationship to the theory of promises is complex. On the one hand, the conditions 
of contractual validity clearly do not track the conditions of promissory obligations. 
On the other, the law can help to inform promisors as to the scope of their 
obligations. The morality of promising, in Webb’s account, is relevant to the theory 
of contract, but the latter “need neither begin nor end with an account of 
promissory obligation.”17 
Penner, Murphy and Webb do not deny that contract law might serve a 
moral function. They depart from Fried only in what each considers that function to 
                                                
12 Liam Murphy, The Practice of Promise and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 12] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
13 Id. at [MS at 20]. 
14 Id. [MS at at 22]. 
15 Webb, supra note 1, at [MS at 14]. 
16 Id. at [MS at 17]. 
17 Id. at [MS at 19]. 
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be. Other theorists maintain that the function of contract law is not to be found in 
the parties’ moral obligations at all. Like Fried, Randy Barnett is an autonomy 
theorist. But Barnett rejects promissory or other moral theories of contract. In this 
volume, he argues that Fried’s promise theory can neither explain the objective 
approach to contract interpretation nor guide lawmakers as to the appropriate 
default rules. More fundamentally, Barnett, like Murphy, argues that the law has no 
business enforcing the private morality of promising. Barnett would not agree with 
Murphy, however, that the function of contract law is therefore to support the 
moral practice more broadly. Rather than focusing on parties’ moral relationships, 
contract law should ask only whether the parties to a transaction have consented to 
legal enforcement—whether at the time of formation they intended to be legally 
bound. Both Fried and Barnett are autonomy theorists. But where Fried’s promise 
theory views contract law as imposing duties based on the parties’ autonomous 
moral act of promising, Barnett characterizes it as conferring on them the legal 
power to autonomously undertake legal obligations to one another, no matter what 
their moral relationship.18 For Barnett, “the private morality of promise resides in 
the realm of ethics,” whereas “the morality of contract resides in the realm of 
justice.”19 
Barnett’s consent theory of contract reflects his principled commitment to a 
libertarian theory of legal entitlements.20 Other theorists provide other arguments 
for depicting contract as a sort of private legislative power that is independent of 
the parties’ promise-based obligations. Dori Kimel has argued that contracts are not 
promises, but substitute for promises in situations where thicker forms of trust are 
not available.21 Michael Pratt has constructed a thought experiment to demonstrate 
how one might undertake contractual obligations while at the same time effectively 
abjuring promissory ones.22 
Another largely amoral account of contractual obligations can be found in 
economic analyses of contract law. The application of economic tools to legal 
questions is more common in the United States than elsewhere in the English-
speaking world. Two chapters in this book provide windows into the approach. 
Avery Katz’s chapter describes the basic concepts of economic legal analysis, such 
as the distinction between positive and normative economic analysis, how 
                                                
18 For more thoughts on theories of contract law as duty-imposing and as power-
conferring, see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and 
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008). 
19 Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 16] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
20 See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2000). 
21 DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
CONTRACT (2002). 
22 Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008). 
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economists model decision making, and efficiency. Katz suggests several reasons to 
think that the normative economic analysis of contract law makes special sense, 
especially when it comes to contracts between sophisticated parties. 
 
In commerce, it is easier to value things in monetary terms and to 
calculate costs and benefits; and economic gain is usually the 
motivation for the transaction. In addition, contractual obligations 
are typically undertaken deliberately, at arms’ length, and with 
managerial oversight if not professional legal assistance. The 
economic model of rational choice provides a more plausible 
account in such settings than it does when applied to less 
calculating actors such as negligent tortfeasors, divorcing spouses, 
criminals, or residential tenants.23 
 
Moreover, because such contracts involve exchanges understood by sophisticated 
parties and to which they must consent, gains in overall efficiency are likely to be 
shared among them to make everyone better off. After mapping out three distinct 
approaches to economic analysis of the law, Katz provides the reader with 
examples of economic analyses of formation rules, the choice between private 
enforcement and state enforcement, contract interpretation, and the measure of 
damages for breach. Katz concludes with a discussion of where economic analysis 
stands with respect to other jurisprudential approaches to contract law. And he 
suggests that whether or not lawyers, judges or legislators accept the prescriptive 
claims of normative economic analysis, they can and should employ the tools of 
economic analysis when performing their various roles. 
My own chapter focuses on the best-known and most controversial 
example of the economic analysis of contract: the theory of efficient breach, which 
first appeared in the literature more than forty years ago. After recounting a simple 
version of the theory and some common noneconomic criticisms of it, I describe 
four ways in which subsequent economic accounts have rejected and moved 
beyond the simple theory. Many non-economist critics of efficient breach, it turns 
out, are criticizing a theory that no serious economist would defend. But contract 
theorists should still pay attention to efficient breach theory. A more sophisticated 
version of the theory reveals three distinctive features of contract law that 
noneconomic theories often overlook: “remedies often affect prices; parties often 
prefer efficient remedies; and lawmakers must decide whether, when or how 
parties might choose the remedy.”24 This claim is consistent with Murphy’s 
suggestion that any instrumentalist theory should take economic analysis into 
                                                
23 Avery W. Katz, Economic Foundations of Contract Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 8] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
24 Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 
LAW ___, [MS at 2] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
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account because economic analysis of the law offers “the only sustained attempt at 
explaining how legal rules affect behavior.”25 
Like consent theories, economic accounts view contract law as functioning 
primarily to confer on parties a private legislative power, rather than as taking 
account of independently acquired moral obligations. On these theories, contract 
law does not serve to enforce, support, or otherwise respond to the parties’ moral 
obligations. These theories do, however, treat contract as a legal analog to the 
moral power of promising. Both contract and promise give persons the ability to 
voluntarily undertake new obligations—one legal, the other moral. This similarity 
provides an independent reason for contract theorists to pay attention to promise 
theory, whether or not they think that the point of contract is to enforce promise-
based obligations. Thus Kimel, who believes that contracts are not promises but 
substitute for them, draws at the end of his chapter an analogy between contract 
and promise. Like promises, contracts can both expand autonomy and, when done 
wrongly, endanger it. Kimel suggests that this helps explain doctrines like the 
consideration requirement and the common use of money damages rather than 
specific performance. And Kimel’s thoughts about a promisee’s moral obligation to 
sometimes release a promisor find their counterpart in George Letsas and Prince 
Saprai’s observations, discussed below, about a nonbreaching party’s obligation to 
mitigate damages. Similarly, Owens’s analysis in this volume of transfer theories of 
promise has implications for transfer theories of contract. Raz’s observations about 
the limits on a promisor’s power to decide the strength of her promise suggest ways 
of thinking about whether parties should have the power to specify the remedy for 
breach. And the Owens and Raz chapters both suggest that contract theorists might 
pay more attention to the legal powers of the promisee, such as waiver, demanding 
adequate assurance, affirmation, cancellation, and a suit for breach. In short, one 
need not be a promise theorist to think that a clear understanding of the morality of 
promising is likely to cast new light on the law of contract. 
The moral theories discussed above largely assume a sphere of moral 
obligations that exists and can be specified independently of the law of contracts. 
Other theorists argue instead for an intrinsic and distinctive morality of contract—
one that might well be compatible with both consent and efficiency theories. 
Daniel Markovits has argued that contracts generate not promises but a distinctive 
form of moral relationship all their own.26 In his chapter in this volume, Markovits 
argues that, properly understood, the obligation of good faith that attaches to every 
contract exemplifies a more general moral relationship of solidarity that contracts 
produce. The case begins with an analysis of the outer bounds of the duty. The 
duty of good faith is, Markovits argues, both “thin (being limited to respect for an 
antecedently and independently agreed surplus allocation) and flexible (being open 
                                                
25 Murphy, supra note 12 [MS at 23]. 
26 See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004). 
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to any surplus allocation on which the parties have so agreed).”27 On this 
interpretation, the duty is neither a separate obligation nor a gap-filling rule, but 
simply the obligation to abide by the parties’ shared intentions with respect to their 
agreement. A party’s duty of good faith is her obligation not to “abandon her 
contractual intentions, including the intention to adjust to unanticipated 
contingencies in a fashion that secures the success of the contractual 
collaboration’s shared plan.”28 This attitude and the distinctive form of solidarity it 
generates together define a moral perspective that underlies not only the 
marketplace, but liberal democratic societies more generally. 
Markovits’s project is to describe a moral relation distinctive of contractual 
relationships. That project involves abstracting from the various other moral 
relations in which contracting parties might find themselves. Thus Markovits goes 
so far as to suggest that “contract possesses the power to launder injustice, creating 
legitimate entitlements between parties where previous there were none.”29 Several 
other contributors emphasize instead ways in which nonvoluntary moral 
obligations apply to contracting parties in their relations with one another. Without 
denying that contracts are distinguished by voluntary obligations—moral, legal or 
both—these authors argue that contracts also implicate other values or moral 
principles, and that a complete account of contract law must attend to those values 
or principles as well. 
Aditi Bagchi argues that as a result of the exclusive focus on promise, 
“contract is not regarded as an elaboration of the standards of fairness in private 
exchange, which might plausibly involve a range of moral principles, but only a 
deconstruction of the morality of promising.”30 Bagchi, however, is interested in 
distributive justice, and especially the fact that the background conditions of many 
contracts involve unjust distribution. She allows that contract law is in several 
respects a poor tool for doing distributive justice. Contracts enforce particular 
agreements, whereas distributive injustice is systematic; the consent of the 
disadvantaged party might seem to vitiate broader claims of distributive justice; and 
there is a real worry that the attempts to regulate inequality in exchange will 
backfire and impose greater harms on disadvantaged parties, whether by producing 
iniquitous terms elsewhere in the transaction or by excluding disadvantaged parties 
from the market. But even granting these worries, Bagchi argues that distributive 
injustices should sometimes inform when society chooses to provide a party with 
the benefit of legal enforcement. And, she argues, a complete account of contract 
                                                
27 Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 14] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). MS at 14. 
28 Id. at [MS at 25]. 
29 Id. at [MS at 24]. 
30 Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 1] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai 
eds., 2014). 
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law must attend to distributive justice, since “some of the background duties that 
infuse contract are derivative from principles of distributive justice.”31 
As already mentioned, George Letsas and Prince Saprai argue in their 
chapter that the mitigation rule is best explained by obligations that are neither 
promissory nor specific to contracts. They maintain that the rule is not, as Charles 
Fried has argued, grounded in a duty of altruism generated by the parties’ 
relationship, but that it is a special application of a general principle of fairness. 
Although the nonbreaching party has no altruistic duty to avoid losses, it would be 
unfair for her to claim compensation for losses that she could have avoided without 
undue burden. Letsas and Saprai argue that the doctrinal elaborations of the 
mitigation rule found in English law largely conform to the requirements of the 
fairness principle. And, they argue, the appeal to fairness provides answers to 
Seana Shiffrin’s claim that the mitigation rule is inconsistent with promissory 
morality and to Dori Kimel’s argument that the mitigation rule is grounded in the 
harm principle. “[S]eemingly divergent doctrines of contract law can be justified if 
one considers the interaction between the promise principle and other moral 
principles.”32 
Mindy Chen-Wishart’s chapter also describes a “conceptual space for the 
operation of principles beyond consent” in contract law.33 Chen-Wishart’s analysis 
focuses on vitiating factors such as incapacity, unconscionability, mistake, 
misrepresentation and duress, or what in the United States are commonly termed 
“formation defenses.” She argues that these doctrines are structured to impose 
responsibility for reasonable expectations and reliance, to ensure fair dealing and 
withhold state support for exploitation, to advance both corrective and distributive 
justice, to advance community values, and to ensure administrability. After 
considering and rejecting consent-based accounts of these rules, Chen-Wishart 
argues that autonomy is a defeasible principle—one that can be overridden by 
other principles, policies and values. Against the charge that such pluralism 
provides no guidance for courts when principles recommend different outcomes or 
rules, Chen-Wishart argues that the several values she identifies are 
complementary. More specifically, because “[t]he value of personal autonomy 
depends on the worthiness of its exercise,” respect for autonomy requires also 
attending to the values that establish that worthiness.34 
Letsas and Saprai’s and Chen-Wishart’s chapters each argues that consent- 
or promise-based principles fail to fully explain or justify the rules of contract law 
                                                
31 Id. at 8. 
32 George Letsas & Prince Saprai, Mitigation, Fairness and Contract Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 20] (Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
33 Mindy Chen-Wishart, The Nature of Vitiating Factors in Contract Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 1] (Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
34 Id. at [MS at 23]. 
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we find in the world around us. To the extent that their arguments start from the 
contract law we have, they can be classified as broadly interpretive. Stephen 
Smith’s chapter on remedies also adopts an interpretive approach, though here 
Smith is interested less in the moral basis of contract law than in its function.35 
Smith poses a basic question about contract remedies: Is the reason for granting the 
remedy the parties’ first-order duty to perform, as suggested by many corrective 
justice theories, or is it the fact that a wrong has been committed by that duty’s 
breach? Smith argues for the latter interpretation, based on the structure and 
framing of common law damage awards, as well as more particular remedial rules 
such as the privity requirement and the ready availability of consequential 
damages. More broadly, the law does not impose a duty to pay damage upon 
breach, but does so only after a court ruling that identifies the appropriate remedy 
for the wrong. Together with additional theoretical considerations, these facts 
suggest that “the aim of damages, in broad outline, is to provide redress for 
wrongs,”36 and “damages orders create rather than confirm duties.”37 Like a fine or 
punitive damages, compensatory damages for breach mark that a wrong has been 
committed and shift responsibility for the consequences of that wrong to the 
wrongdoer. “[D]amages are the private law equivalent of punishment.”38 
Smith’s analysis exemplifies a tradition of interpretive and conceptual legal 
analysis that is stronger in Commonwealth countries than in the United States. Such 
scholarship aims to uncover the law’s immanent logic and the legal principles that 
a common law judge might rely on to extend an existing rule to a novel case or to 
resolve inconsistencies within the doctrine. To US theorists and jurists steeped in 
the Legal Realist tradition, such arguments might appear formalist. But they can 
also figure into theories of the function or justification of contract law by suggesting 
alternative purposes the law might serve, and providing a better understanding of 
which theories fit with existing practice and which recommend revising it. 
Much in contract theory depends on the choice of examples or paradigm 
cases. Those who find the function of contract in the parties’ moral obligations 
often focus on relatively low-stakes agreements between natural persons. Those 
who think of contract primarily as a private legislative power are more likely to 
emphasize high-stakes transactions between sophisticated parties, especially firms. 
(Barnett, whose consent theory is grounded in libertarian considerations, is an 
exception to the latter generalization.) The importance of examples can also be 
seen in the differences between the contributions of Lisa Bernstein and Margaret 
Jane Radin. 
                                                
35 Smith’s interpretive argument for a rights-based promise theory of contract can 
be found in STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004). 
36 Stephen A. Smith, Remedies for Breach of Contract: One Principle or Two?, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 18] (Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
37 Id. at [MS at 20]. 
38 Id. at [MS at 21]. 
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Working within a broadly instrumentalist framework, Lisa Bernstein 
explores the interaction between legal obligations and extralegal forms of 
assurance such as repeat-play, reputation, and nonlegal norms. Her thesis is 
twofold. First, she argues against attempts to give legal effect to customary business 
norms, commonly referred to as “trade usage.” Using a mix of empirical and 
informal economic analysis, Bernstein argues that in many economic spheres there 
is no widespread agreement on trade usage, that where trade usage does exist it is 
often difficult to verify in court, and that most sophisticated parties do not want 
courts to use trade usage to interpret their agreements. Second, Bernstein criticizes 
courts’ use of two other types of context evidence: course of dealings—the parties’ 
actions in earlier similar transactions—and course of performance—how the parties 
performed under the contract at issue. One problem with using such evidence is 
that every deviation from contractual requirements then has the potential to change 
the parties’ legal obligations. That result is likely to deter the flexibility in 
performance that many contemporary transactions require, which in turn can 
prevent the parties from utilizing “extralegal commitments backed only by 
reputation bonds and other types of nonlegal sanctions.”39 Another problem is that 
the use of such evidence increases a large organization’s costs of doing business, as 
it must constantly monitor employees’ actions to guard against unwanted changes 
to the organization’s legal obligations. Again, Bernstein collects a range of 
empirical evidence that, for these and other reasons, sophisticated parties 
commonly craft their contracts to exclude such evidence from the interpretation of 
their contracts. If Bernstein is correct, no matter what the social interest in 
enforcing the obligations generated by parties’ actual expectations and agreements, 
sophisticated parties do not want such enforcement. And if given the opportunity, 
they will contract out of it. 
Bernstein’s arguments are an example of the new formalism in contract 
theory. “New” here refers not to the theory’s vintage. The arguments have now 
been around for over twenty years.40 It is used, rather, to distinguish the theory from 
an older formalism often associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell and 
Samuel Williston and sharply criticized by the first generation of Legal Realists. In 
contrast to the old formalism, the new formalism employs instrumentalist, 
economic and empirical arguments, putting it squarely in the Realist camp. 
Margaret Jane Radin’s chapter also adopts a broadly empirical and Realist 
approach, but emphasizes the costs of formalism in other contracting contexts. 
                                                
39 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 29] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
40 For an early example, see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules 
for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990); for a recent example, see 
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation: The 
Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 170 (2013). 
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Where Bernstein is interested in the rules for interpreting valid contracts, Radin 
focuses on the rules that determine whether a contract is valid. And where 
Bernstein limits her analysis to contracts between sophisticated parties, Radin 
considers transactions with nonsophisticates. Radin’s topic is transactions in which 
an unsophisticated party agrees to a form contract provided on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis by a sophisticated party that engages in many similar transactions. Common 
examples of such “boilerplate” contracts include employment contracts, consumer 
contracts, and the licensing agreements to which users “agree” every time they 
choose to install or update a piece of software. The enforcement of these 
agreements in the United States turns almost entirely on the nonsophisticated 
party’s formal act of agreement, without a significant inquiry into the quality of her 
consent or the fairness of the terms. The reason, Radin argues, is that in the United 
States the only mechanism for policing these agreements is the judicially developed 
unconscionability doctrine. After identifying several problems with that approach, 
Radin suggests a nonformalist framework for determining when to enforce 
boilerplate terms. Here Radin emphasizes not only the potential costs to the 
individual who agrees to unfavorable terms, but also the costs of the “large-scale 
remedy-deletion”41 as terms proliferate, especially with respect to entitlements that 
are “components of public regimes underwritten by the polity for the sake of the 
structure of the polity itself.”42 Radin argues that we should not think of such 
entitlements as either alienable or inalienable. Rather, we should consider making 
some entitlements more difficult to sell than others. And if a contract purports to 
transfer such an entitlement, the legal rule should examine not only the quality of 
consent and the effects for the parties, but also the social and political effects of 
widespread use of the term at issue. Public structures such as tort, contract and 
antidiscrimination law “should not be undermined by individual contracts, 
especially not when the contracts themselves may in fact be non-contracts.”43 
Several chapters in this book address metatheoretical issues, such as what is 
the question contract theorists should be asking and what sorts of arguments, 
analyses or data can succeed in answering it. Charlie Webb spends a number of 
pages arguing for the possibility of nonevaluative accounts of legal practices 
generally. 
 
Legal practice . . . provides us with two distinct objects of inquiry: (1) we 
can inquire into how, as a matter of fact, decisions are and have been made 
within a particular community or across a set of communities; and (2) we 
can adopt the perspective of those acting within such a community, setting 
                                                
41 Margaret Jane Radin, An Analytic Framework for Legal Evaluation of Boilerplate, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 4] (Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
42 Id. at [MS at 38]. 
43 Id. at [MS at 38-39]. 
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out to answer the same practical questions they face, identifying how they 
really ought act.44 
 
Webb deploys the possibility of nonevaluative legal theory to argue against the 
relevance of interpretive theory along the lines Dworkin describes and Smith and 
others practice.45 
 
[W]hile we shouldn’t deny that an inquiry into reasons which might be said 
to support these practices has the option not to consider those reasons on 
their merits, once we abandon the search for the reasons which have in fact 
guided these practices, it’s not clear why this is an option anyone would 
want to take.46 
 
Other chapters also address what makes for good contract theory. Murphy argues 
that contract theorists should attend to the normative structure of existing contract 
laws, but should not treat that structure as a limit on the contract law we might 
want. Katz’s chapter on economic analysis is as much about the method of doing 
contract theory as it is about the purpose or design contract law. Bernstein’s 
chapter illustrates ways contract theorists might engage more with empirical work. 
And Murphy and I both argue that they should engage more with economic 
analyses of contract. 
In our attempt to capture both the substantive and methodological variety 
of contract theory within the space of a single volume we have had to omit 
examples of each. If Oxford University Press had given us two volumes for this 
project, we would also have included examples of reliance theories,47 of corrective 
justice theories,48 of civil recourse theories,49 and of transfer theories.50 We would 
                                                
44 Webb, supra note 1, at [MS at 4] (footnote omitted). 
45 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). Jules Coleman, no Dworkinian, also 
defends the relevance of interpretive legal theory. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE 
OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 3–12 
(2001). 
46 Webb, supra note 1, at [MS at 8]. 
47 The classic reliance theorist was P.S. Atiyah. See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, 
Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 LAW Q. REV. 193 (1978). For more recent 
work along these lines, see T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY 
OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 86 (Peter Benson, ed. 2001). 
48 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment & Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 2003); Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with 
Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013 (2007). 
49 See, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of 
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011). 
50 See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(2009). 
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also have sought out examples of critical theories of contract,51 recent attempts to 
apply behavioral economics and the methods of empirical psychology to contract 
law,52 and theories that draw from major philosophical frameworks such as those of 
Hegel or Aristotle.53 We believe, however, that the selection presented here will 
provide the reader with a general introduction to the field. And we are enormously 
grateful to the contributors to this volume, whose novel works are significantly 
advancing our understanding of contract. 
 
                                                
51 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form & Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical 
Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195 (1987); Patricia J. Williams, 
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. 
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). 
52 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 STAN L. REV. 213 (1995); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, 
Breach is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1001 (2010). 
53 See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT 
LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118 (Peter Benson, ed. 2001); James Gordley, Contract Law in the 
Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 265 (Peter 
Benson, ed. 2001). 
